

Evaluating *each*- (but not *every*-) sentences encourages encoding individual properties

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
Big picture: meanings in mental grammar

How detailed are meaning representations?

How are they related to non-linguistic cognition?

"Every circle is green"

*The circles are such that
all of them are green*



How are universal quantifiers mentally represented?

Logical & psychological distinction

- ➔ First-order (individual-implicating) vs. Second-order (group-implicating)
- ➔ Object-files vs. Ensembles





Every-sentences trigger ensemble (group) representations

Each-sentences trigger object-file (individual) representations

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Many ways to describe “every circle is green”




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For each individual _x , if it _x is a circle, it _x is green <u>UNIVERSE</u> : $\forall x[\text{Circle}(x) \rightarrow \text{Green}(x)]$		}	Unrestricted First-order
The circles _x are included in the green-things _y <u>UNIVERSE</u> : $\text{TheX:Circle}(X) \subseteq \text{TheY:Green}(Y)$			
The circles _x are such that all of them _x are green <u>CIRCLES</u> : $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$		}	Restricted Second-order
The individual circles _x are s.t. each one _x is green <u>CIRCLES</u> : $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$			

(Knowlton et al. CUNY 2020)

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“Each/Every circle is green”

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The individual circles _x are s.t. each one _x is green <u>CIRCLES</u> : $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$		}	Restricted First-order

x can take on ≥ 1 value at a time

x can take on only 1 value at a time

(Boolos 1984, 1985, 1998; Schein 1993; Pietroski 2018)

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
Different underlying cognitive

Second-order representations (every)

CIRCLES: $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)] \approx$ The circles_x are such



take on ≥ 1
value at a time




First-order representations (each) rely on **object-files**

CIRCLES: $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx$ The individual circles_x are s.t. each one_x is green



take on only 1
value at a time

Objects individuated
individual properties encoded



(e.g., Kahnemann et al. 1992; Pylyshyn & Storm 1998; Scholl, Pylyshyn & Feldman 2001; Scholl 2002; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke 2004; Carey 2009)


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Different underlying cognitive systems

Second-order representations (every) rely on **ensembles**

CIRCLES: $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)] \approx$ The circles_x are such that all of them_x are green

Which side has **more** circles?




Objects abstracted away from
summary statistics encoded

Ensemble₁
Center: (x,y)
Cardinality: 4
Avg. Size:

First-order representations (each) rely on **object-files**

CIRCLES: $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx$ The individual circles_x are s.t. each one_x is green

Objects individuated
individual properties encoded




(e.g., Ariely 2001; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke 2004; Alvarez 2011; Haberman, Brady & Alvarez 2015; Ward, Bear & Scholl 2016; Whitney & Leib 2018)

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Different representations & cognitive systems

Second-order representations (*every*) rely on **ensembles**

CIRCLES: $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)] \approx$ The circles_x are such that all of them_x are green



take on ≥ 1
value at a time

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Ensemble₁

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
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Center: (x,y)
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Avg. Size:

Every-sentences trigger ensemble (group) representations

Each-sentences trigger object-file (individual) representations

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
Different behavioral predictions

Linking hypothesis: people are biased toward verification strategies that **directly compute the relations & operations expressed** by the semantic representation under evaluation (Lidz et al. 2011)

First-order (*each*)

CIRCLES: $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$
≈ The individual circles_x are such that each one_x is green


Encode individual properties (e.g., color)



Second-order (*every*)

CIRCLES: $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$
≈ The circles_x are such that all of them_x are green

Encode summary statistics (e.g., #)



Abstract away from individual properties


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{Each/Every} big circle is blue

TRUE FALSE


How many {big/medium/small} circles were there?

Cardinality (*group* property)



(Knowlton, Pietroski, Halberda & Lidz CUNY 2019)

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- ➔ Object-files vs. Ensembles



Every-sentences trigger ensemble (group) representations

- ➔ Evaluating *every*-sentences leads participants to encode cardinality

Each-sentences trigger object-file (individual) representations

Different behavioral predictions


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First-order (*each*)

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\approx The individual circles_x are such that each one_x is green

Encode individual properties (e.g., color)




Second-order (*every*)

CIRCLES: $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$


\approx The circles_x are such that all of them_x are green

Encode summary statistics (e.g., #)




Abstract away from individual properties

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
300 ms



Color (*individual* property)





Color category naming task



(Bae, Olkkonen, Allred & Flombaum 2015)

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
How are universal quantifiers mentally represented?

Second-order / group-implicating: *Every*

The circles_x are such that all of them_x are green

CIRCLES: $\forall X[\text{Green}(X)]$

→ Ensemble representations




First-order / individual-implicating: *Each*

The individual circles_x are such each one_x is green

CIRCLES: $\forall x[\text{Green}(x)]$

→ Object-file representations



Acquisition question:

What leads learners to pair “each” and “every” with the right concepts?



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How are universal quantifiers mentally represented?

Differences in child-directed speech

Each – generalize over **local domain**

“You have to ring up **each** thing”

“Could you put a flower on **each** plate?”

“Put sugar in **each** coffee”

Every – **project beyond** the local domain

“**Every** time I ask a question, you say you don’t know”

“You turn into a wild man **every** time we get out”

“She watches **every** movie they make”

Acquisition question:

What leads learners to pair “each” and “every” with the right concepts?



(Knowlton & Lidz forthcoming)

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Thanks!

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